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INTRODUCTION
1. The Zimbabwe economy's agricultural/pastoral sector is confronted by five 
major problems:
a. production whose trend rate of growth over the pa3t quarter century 
is less than two thirds that of population;
b. growth of productive employment/self employment which has been very 
low for the economy as a whole and negative in large scale 
agriculture;
c. balance of payments pressures arising both out of slow production 
growth and the import intensive nature of the large farm sub-sector's 
capital and operating technology;
d. inequality of landholding and lack of access to adequate land to 
achieve a level of output providing a decent income for many rural 
families;
e. massive new or underutilisation of land in the large farm sub-sector.
2. These problems are interrelated. Communal and settlement area 
agriculture is in many parts of the country showing substantial dynamism 
as to output but is constrained by lack of land and especially of land of 
average quality or above. The large commercial farm sector shows less 
dynamism in respect to total output and j.ittxe> if any, sustained trend 
toward reducing the degree of non and underutilisation. Indeed in 
general it lacks the access to additional capital and to additional
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managerial skills necessary for major expansion. Even if it did not, 
Zimbabwe lacks the foreign exchange to support rapid expansion of the 
acreage fully utilised by the large commercial farm sector employing its 
present import intensive capital and operating technology. Therefore the 
rural sector does not provide opportunities for substantial increases in 
employment/self employment at socially acceptable income levels. Large 
commercial farm employment is declining as owners substitute scarce 
imported capital goods for plentiful Zimbabwean labour while increasing 
population on communal area land increases the number who are perforce 
self employed there but not the number able to produce adequate incomes 
from the land.
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
3. Agricultural production’s trend rate of growth since 1960 appears to be 
in the range 2 to 2.25% a year. While there are sharp swings around this 
growth path - largely related to weather but partly to relative price, 
and therefore landuse, shifts - there is no evidence of any significant 
change in the trend. This growth rate of rural production is clearly
inconsistent with the development of the Zimbabwean economy. For one
thing it is less than two thirds of the rate of growth of population. 
Continuation of the present trend would rapidly turn Zimbabwe into a
substantial net food importer, force steady erosion of agricultural 
exports and of agriculture based manufacturing by shifting land from
industrial/export crops to staple foods and/or lead to growing 
malnutrition and real dangers of starvation during drought cycles.
4. There is no reason to expect the production trend to improve on its own
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without state intervention. Much of the growth in the 1970’s was secured 
by extending the area under irrigation. Future expansion along these 
lines will be constrained both by the higher cost per hectare of 
remaining potential areas and the ceiling imposed by river flow and water 
table regeneration capacity. The trend for large commercial farmers to 
utilise a substantial portion of their gross investment to substitute for 
labour rather than to increase output has accelerated since independence. 
While this may well be rational at the micro production/ownership unit 
level, it is at the macro level inconsistent with maximising growth of 
rural output, expanding rural employment or reducing equality of income 
distribution and, as noted above involves substituting a scarce factor of 
production largely embodied in imports for plentiful Zimbabwean labour. 
Nor, on past evidence, does this capital intensive agricultural 
sub-sector achieve a high rate of return on average or incremental 
investment especially when account is taken of supporting public sector 
stock capital and of operational services and production subsidies.
5. The small scale - communal and settlement - agricultural sector has, - 
since independence, appeared to show more dynamism. It is hard to 
quantify this trend both because of the severe drought conditions 
prevailing over 1982-84 and because the period is relatively brief. 
However, commercialised production certainly has increased very sharply 
both in staple food and in industrial/export crops. This increase has 
been achieved at relatively low scarce resource costs. Access to 
markets, provision of extension advice, access to (and limited initial 
subsidisation of) inputs combined with access to new land outside the 
communal areas have been the main causal factors. This trend, 
unfortunately, is likely to be slowed or halted in the forseeable future 
unless continued access to land can be achieved.
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6. Employment in Zimbabwe is a major problem at macro economic level. The
trend rate of growth of wage employment appears to embody two factors.
The first is a 1Í per year decline in employment resulting from
substitution of capital for labour and/or increased labour productivity 
(e.g. as a result of higher average levels of skills from more training 
and longer average job experience). The second is an increase (or 
decrease) in employment at a percentage rate equal to half the previous 
year’s change in real GDP. This implies that to achieve a rate of growth 
of wage employmnet equal to that of population at 3*5 % would require 
sustained real GDP growth of 9% per year (i.e. a 4.5Í employment gain 
from growth less the 1Í a year trend fall). This is patently impossible. 
Reorientation of the economy ~ or at least some sectors - on less capital 
intensive lines may be possible but, outside agriculture, the short term
prospects are either not very promising or are not large enough to
/generate significant overall wage employment increases. Self employment 
clearly is growing rapidly - the majority of new entrants into the labour 
force are clearly not securing wage jobs nor are they unemployed (indeed 
they could not survive if they were). However, there is little reason to 
be optimistic that the present urban informal and small scale rural 
sectors can provide annually 250,000 self employment opportunities 
productive enough and fairly remunerated enough to provide humanly and 
politically acceptable income levels for these Zimbabweans. Yet 250,000 
a year is the likely level of the numbers of human beings requiring such 
self employment over the next decade.
7. The employment/self employment trends and prospects in agriculture are, 
if anything, even less satisfactory. Wage employment is declining as a 
result of systematic use of capital and organisational patterns to
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economise on labour. Only a massive cut in real agriculture wages - 
which is neither humanly acceptable nor politically practicable - or a 
massive tax on investment goods used in agriculture - which would also 
pose severe problems - seems likely to reverse this trend in the large 
scale commercial agricultural sub sector. The communal and settlement 
sub sectors - which provide basically self employment plus some wage 
employment (largely seasonal) - have different trends and face different 
constraints. In the communal sector there are on the order of 
500-600,000 households. Given the quantity and quality of land 
available, perhaps one third could earn decent self employment incomes 
from agriculture in these areas were the other two thirds able to shift 
their economic base to settlement agriculture and/or to wage employment. 
While production growth has exceeded population growth in these areas 
since independence, how long this can be continued with increasing
population and no substantial margin of unused productive land is open to
/question. Settlement has to date been limited by organisational and cost
issues but, increasingly, by access to suitable land. As the backlog of
abandoned farms is used up this land availability constraint will become 
the critical barrier to increasing rural self employment which generates 
reasonable productivity and socially acceptable household incomes.
8. Unless the rate of growth of agricultural output can be increased
agricultural exports cannot be expected to contribute significantly to 
the 6Í a year sustained export growth Zimbabwe requires to achieve a 5 to 
1% sustainable rate of growth of production which in turn is critical to 
achieving moderate (say 1 to 2% annually) gains in real personal
consumption, attainment of universal access to basic social and 
productive services (e.g. education, health, pure water, agricultural 
extension) and a strengthening of the present low share of savings in
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GDP. Indeed if food demand rises with population at 3*5? a year while 
agricultural output rises only 2.5? a year, agricultural exports are 
likely to fall as present food surpluses (e.g. maize, beef, sugar) are 
eroded by rising consumption and food crops compete ever more fiercely 
with export/industrial crops for ever scarcer land. To achieve a 
reversal of this trend by enhanced agricultural investment on high 
technology lines is not feasibe. The import content (direct and 
indirect) of fixed investment is over 50? while the incremental 
capital/output ratio is about 2\ to 1. In large scale commercial 
agriculture the import content may be somewhat lower - say 40? - but the 
capital/output ratio is apparently significantly higher - in the 3 to 5 
to 1 range. The import burden of expanding agricultural output at - say 
- 4 to 5% on large commercial farm technological and capital patterns is, 
therefore, unsustainable.
9. Inequality of landholding in Zimbabwe is a major human, social and 
political issue. The "land question” was central to the creation of 
Zimbabwean nationalism. However, it is not simply a racial question - 
the continued juxtaposition of large individual and corporate holdings 
(whoever owns them) with substantial un or underutilised land on the one 
hand and of many sub-marginal or landless rural households with no access 
to wage or decent income generating self employment on the other hand is 
no more socially or politically stable than it is morally or humanly 
acceptable. Because rapid expansion of reasonably productive rural self 
employment is crucial for both employment and production goals, forms and 
degrees of inequality in landholding which radically limit access to land 
cannot be defended logically nor sustained politically.
10. Repeated academic, consultancy and other technical studies have concluded
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that the bulk of the land in the large commercial farming sector is not 
fully utilised. The recent World Bank sectoral report on agriculture and 
sources cited in it suggest that 80% of commercial sub-sector arable and 
a high proportion of ranching land is either un or underutilised. This 
does not primarily take the form of totally un or underutilised farms but 
of concentration of production on a small proportion of the hectorage on 
almost every farm with the balance very marginally used or left idle. 
The capital costs and managerial problems in radical expansion of land 
utilisation are such that few large commercial farmers could meet them. 
At the same time the costs of holding on to unused or barely used land 
are very low so there is no present likelihood of its being abandoned or 
made available to the state or to potential smallholders at low cost.
LAND TAXATION
11. Land taxation in Zimbabwe should be designed to address the basic rural 
problems of inadequate growth of production and of employment together 
with inequality in landholding combined with underutilisation of land. 
It should not be seen primarily as a revenue raising device, albeit any 
fiscal measure which can provide significant increases in revenue while 
neither severely deterring production, increasing inequality of after tax 
income distribution nor posing massive assessment and collection problems 
is worth serious consideration.
12. Any system of land taxation to be introduced must also take account of 
the need to avoid causing sudden, large falls in the output of the 
present commercial farming sub-sector. At present - and for the 
immediate future - substantial maintenance, and preferably at least
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modest expansion, of output in that sub-sector is critical. The rapid 
substitution of small holdings or settlements for existing large farms on 
their fully utilised hectarage would lead to substantial initial falls in 
output because the incoming small holders could not utilise the capital 
intensive, high technology patterns of the present owners nor, in the 
short run, substitute equally efficient labour intensive, intermediate 
technology systems.
13. Elements relevant to constructing a land tax system appropriate to the 
forgoing goals and constraints include:
a. taxation bearing heavily on non or underutilisation of land;
b. progressivity of taxation with respect to hectarage held;
c. low incremental tax impact with respect to additional gross or net 
production.
14. Two taxes appear to meet these tests:
a. a tax on rated output capacity (related to type and grade of land) 
which can be offset against normal income tax and for fully utilised 
units would be equal to or less than income tax and thus fully 
offsettable giving a zero marginal rate with respect to net output;
b. a progressive tax on hectares held (again related to type and grade 
of land) independent of output and therefore also having a zero 
marginal rate with respect to output.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
15. Neither a tax on rated output capacity nor a progressive land tax would 
conflict with the provisions of the Zimbabwe Constitution. Both would be 
well within the limits accepted in western legal traditions and decisions 
as proper tax measures for proper state purposes in pursuit of the public 
interest.
16. Neither measure would be confiscatory. This is self evidently true of a 
rated capacity land tax which on properly utilised land can be fully 
offset against income tax. No less confiscatory tax can readily be 
imagined. Certainly such a tax would seek to ensure that the nation’s 
land was more fully and productively utilised but that is an eminently 
proper - and indeed common - aim of public policy in general and of tax 
policy in particular. Nothing in such a tax would forbid the present 
land owner to utilise the land more fully himself or to sell it to 
someone who would do so. If he were to hoard land and to pay high taxes 
for doing so that would be his own decision not that of the state nor an 
inherent result of the tax. Progressive land taxation would be no more 
confiscatory than any other type of progressive taxation. It would - 
because not related to production - have less of a disincentive effect to 
raising net income from large farms than the existing progressive income 
tax, but is otherwise legally and morally virtually indistinguishable 
from it. The raising of adequate revenues to sustain the programmes 
properly decided upon by a legitimate state and the use of taxation as an 
instrument to limit inequality of wealth and of income are both firmly 
established in legal theory and precedent as among the inherent rights of 
a state (indeed they are usually viewed as among its obligations as well) 
and as in no way inherently confiscatory. Admittedly a progressive land
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tax could be abused and could be set at levels which would be 
confiscatory. The possibility of abuse, however, does not render the 
principle of progressive taxation nor its legitimate application improper 
or unlawful.
17. Neither a rated capacity tax nor a progressive land tax would constitute 
confiscation within the meaning of the Constitution. Nothing in either 
would require the present landholder to sell. They might create 
circumstances under which he judged that it would be economically 
advantageous for him to do so, but that is true of many public policy 
measures including many tax measures and is far from compulsory sale let 
alone compulsory purchase legislation. Further, even were a landholder 
to decide to sell there is nothing in a rated capacity tax or in a 
progressive land tax to require him to sell to the state - much less to 
do so at any particular price. Therefore any purchases of land by the 
state subsequent to the enactment of such taxes would be acceptance of 
offers by the state as a willing buyer of offers for sale made by the 
present landholder as a willing seller, just as any sales by present 
landholders to individuals or corporate persons would also be on a 
willing buyer, willing seller basis. Therefore no special principles of 
valuation nor any special right to the form or remittance abroad of the 
proceeds of such sales would arise. If the amount or form of the payment 
and/or the Exchange Control regulations covering remittances of capital 
were seen by the landholder as unsatisfactory, he could decline to sell.
18. The purposes to be served by such taxes: increasing agricultural output; 
discouraging the holding of under or unutilised land; promoting 
additional employment and self employment; improving the balance of 
payments and ensuring adequacy of domestic food supply; reducing extreme
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inequality and increasing the access of citizens to land; and raising 
revenue are all eminently proper public purposes. Legal doctrine and
/precedent are both abundantly clear that taxes designed to serve proper 
public purposes are not to be deemed unconstitutional because they impose 
costs on certain sections of the community unless gross abuse and/or 
narrowly discriminatory intent can be proven. If this were not the case 
virtually all forms of taxation would be held to be unlawful and the 
state would be rendered powerless to discharge its obligations, however 
solemn, or to pursue its purposes, however proper and however much 
publicly supported.
19. A partial precedent exists in Zimbabwe's neighbour Botswana. There 
prospecting and mining rights and land concessions were being hoarded not 
used. This hampered prospecting and the development of the mining 
industry as well as the exercise of proper urban planning and the access 
of urban residents to housing sites. There is in the Botswana 
constitution a clause protecting property rights. To overcome the social 
evils inherent in land right hoarding without tampering with the 
protection of property rights, the Botswana government took measures 
including a progressive tax on prospecting and mining rights postively 
related to the length of time they had been held without developing a 
mine and with provisions allowing offsetting of the tax against approved 
prospecting, proving and development expenditure. While not identical, 
the problems faced by the Republic of Botswana and the measures used by 
it are in many ways comparable to the problems set out and the measures 
proposed in this paper.
éRATED CAPACITY TAX
20. A rated capacity land tax is in effect a tax on non or underutilisation 
of land. It does not rise with greater actual' production and - if
offsettable against income tax - imposes no burden on the landholder
using his land fully. It declines as a proportion of output as output is 
raised. Therefore, it provides a positive incentive for fuller 
utilisation of and production from land.
21. The broad outline of the proposed tax includes:
a. rating capacity output on the basis of efficient full utilisation of 
the land held;
b. dividing land into about ten categories for the basis of output
rating, e.g:
i. land with access to irrigation (whether actually
irrigated or not);
ii. good dry farming arable;
iii. average dry farming arable;
iv. poor dry farming arable;
v. cultivated tree or bush crop;
vi. good pastoral; 
vii. average pastoral; 
viii. poor pastoral;
ix. woodlot and forest; 
x. other (e.g. residential).
c. The tax would not apply to urban areas nor to land used for approved 
non-agricultural purposes;
d. the tax would be levied as a percentage of gross rated capacity
output - say 10Í;
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e. the tax could be offset against income tax relating to the same 
landholding (but not to income tax liability relating to other 
landholdings or sources of taxable income);
f. holdings under a minimum rated capacity, say $2,000 - perhaps
corresponding to 10 hectares of average arable or 100 hectares of 
poor pastoral land or a combination thereof - would be exempt from 
tax. This exemption would be analagous to that applying to incomes 
below a certain level in the Income Tax Act. Analagous exemption 
provisions would be made on a per household basis (with a grace 
period to carry out full settlement) for communal settlement and 
production co-operative landholdings.
The tentative rate of 10$ is based on preliminary calculations that net 
operating income of the large commercial farming sub sector is
approximately 40$ of gross and (after allowances and deductions) is
/
subject to an average income tax rate of 25$. Thus for a farm of average 
efficiency of operation on all of its landholding the 10$ gross rated 
capacity tax would be fully offset against the income tax payable.
22. The attractions of this form of tax include:
a. it would create no pressure on large scale commercial farmers to 
reduce output on presently fully utilised hectarage - quite the 
contrary;
b. therefore, it should not lead to alarm or despondency by farmers 
properly utilising their holdings, but should lead to such farmers 
either developing or disposing of presently underutilised or unused 
land;
c. the present output on such land is by definition low so that the 
output at risk would be minimal;
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d. whereas evidence from the communal and settlement areas indicates 
that even initial and more especially medium term output by peasant 
farmers would be substantial, most certainly above the present output 
levels of un or underutilised land;
e. while there is nothing in the tax to prevent sale to other present
large scale commercial farmers or to potential entrants into that
sub-sector, for most commercial farmers, finance, imported equipment 
and materials and managerial constraints are likely to impose severe 
limitations on such purchases of land to develop;
f. therefore, it would be appropriate for the state to stand ready - on
a willing buyer - willing seller basis - to acquire land either to 
allocate to settlement schemes, production co-operatives or 
individual smallholders on a leasehold basis or to sell to them on a 
time payment basis;
g. because there would be no incentive to sell utilised land or the 
improvements, equipment, buildings and herds on it and because it is 
likely that there would be a buyers market in under and unutilised 
land, the cost to the state of securing land would be much lower than 
if entire farms were purchased either on a willing buyer - willing 
seller or a compulsory purchase basis;
h. while this would mean that development costs would be incurred - by 
the state for basic infrastructure and services and by the peasant 
farmers for land improvement, buildings, equipment, herds and working 
capital - these costs would not necessarily be much higher than when 
whole farms are acquired because much of the infrastructure for 
peasant farming is absent on such farms (and especially on the un or 
underutilised portions) and much of the large farm assets (in 
particular high income housing and related amenities) are of little
value to the new users of the land;
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i. peasant farm development (as well as rural infrastructure 
construction) can make substantial use of rural labour whether on the 
basis of the farmer investing in improving his own land improvements 
and buildings or/and via off season and work relief (during drought 
years) wage employment of the incoming farm families and other rural 
residents. In addition the simpler construction and implements 
required for peasant farming at a $1,000 to $2,000 gross income level 
(including production for household provisioning) both have a lower 
cost per person or household gainfully employed and a lower import 
content than for the capital intensive, high technology approach of 
large commercial farms; 
j. measures to provide for financing of land purchases; organisation and 
allocation of land to settlements, co-operatives and peasants; to 
supply initial finance (in cash or materials) to incoming farmers to 
augment their labour and existing resources; and to finance, 
construct and operate basic infrastructure and services would be 
needed. These would require adaptation and development of the 
present settlement, extension of basic services to rural areas and 
agricultural marketing and- extension reorientation to serve all 
farmers approaches - not any basic changes in their strategy. Their 
details are beyond the scope of the present paper on land taxation; 
k. a substantial portion of the land transferred to peasant use would be 
suitable for maize, oilseeds and tobacco. Experience since 
Independence has demonstrated the capacity of Zimbabwe peasant 
farmers to achieve significant and rising outputs per hectare of 
these crops and thereby to generate acceptable household incomes if 
they have access to adequate land. Maize is needed to ensure self 
sufficiency in staple food availability and to allow regional market 
exports. Sorghum and millet (beyond grower household consumption)
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can be directed to livestock feeding reducing the growing pressure 
this use now imposes on maize supplies. Additional oilseed 
production is needed to replace imports and to augment cattle feed 
supplies and could also provide additional exports. Enhanced cotton 
and tobacco production are important to b able to meet growing 
domestic use requirements while increasing the earnings from these 
major exports. Similarly additional small stock and beef production 
on pastoral land is needed to augment local meat supply (both because 
of population growth and to improve the intake of animal protein), to 
increase the availability of industial raw materials (e.g hides for 
leather and leather manufactures; hooves, offal and bones for glue 
and meal; - tallow for soap and candles) and to capitalise on EEC, 
other European, African and Gulf export market potential;
1. tax revenue from this tax is hard to estimate. Were there to be no 
changes in landholding ownership or utilisation it might be of the 
order of $75 to 100 million a year over and above the amount 
offsettable against income tax. However, that is not a realistic 
future revenue estimate as large commercial farmers could not bear 
this additional tax on unchanged incomes for very long and would 
either develop or sell. If all presently under and unutilised land 
were either developed or transferred to state and peasant ownership 
the tax revenue would be nil. That too is an unlikely estimate for 
the first five years of the tax as both selling and - especially - 
development take time. A rough estimate of initial year revenue 
might be of the order of $40-60 million declining by the fifth year 
to $5-15 million. As noted, revenue is an incidental rather than a 
central goal of this tax.
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23. Certain technical information and elaboration woud be necessary to decide
on the exact form of rates for and schedules to the gross rated capacity
tax and to draft a bill:
a. determination of the number and definition of land categories needed 
for rating purposes;
b. rough survey of hectarage in each category;
c. checking data on average ratio of net operating to gross output and 
of actual average income tax liability after allowances and 
deductions as a percentage of net operating income (if substantial 
differences exist among, e.g. irrigated, dry farming arable, pastoral 
and tree crop different gross tax rates might be appropriate);
d. possible forms of abatement in years of bad rainfall - perhaps on a 
district by district basis;
e. indexation of the rated capacity either in terms of an agricultural 
price index or in some other way;
f. provision for decennial revision to take account of productivity 
potential changes;
g. simple procedures for allocating hectarage on a holding among land 
categories to arrive at initial rated capacity value;
h. integration of the tax with the land register to ensure 
identification of taxable landholdings and removal of holdings 
transferred to holders not liable to tax (i.e. those under the 
minimum hectarage or the state);
i. a collection procedure related to that for income tax to allow direct 
offsets and combined payment of the total amount due;
j. an appeals procedure initially to a specialist tribunal system and
ultimately to the high court system with requirement to deposit tax 
claimed before access to the appeals procedure.
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24. Illustrative examples
Hectares 500 Arable Rated Capacity $200/ha
Fully Utilised 100 ha - Gross Income $21,500
Underutilised 150 ha - Gross Income 8,500
Unutilised 250 ha - Gross Income Nil
Total Gross Income 30,000
Net Operating Income 12,000
Income Tax Payable 3,000
Rated Capacity Income 100,000
Rated Capacity Tax 10,000
Additional Tax Payable 7,000
If the owner divested the 250 ha unutilised his additional tax 
liability would fall to 2,000. He could reduce it to 0 either by 
divesting the underutilised land or by raising output on it to 
$2 8 , 500 .
Hectares 500 Arable Rated Capacity $200/ha
Fully Utilised 400 ha - Gross Income $90,000
Underutilised 50 ha - Gross Income 9,000
Unutilised 50 ha - Gross Income Nil
Total Gross Income $99,000
Net Operating Income $42,000
Income Tax Payable $10,500
Rated Capacity Income $100,000
Rated Capacity Tax 10,000
Additional Tax Payable Nil
In this case 80$ of the land is fully utilised with outstanding (over
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standard rated capacity) gross yields and an above average ratio of 
net operating to gross income. This farmer could, in fact, retain 
his modest under and unutilised proportions of landholding for future 
development at no tax cost.
25. The results of a rated capacity land tax are projected as including:
a. modest expansion in fully utilised large commercial farm sub-sector 
hectarage and output;
b. substantial transfers of presently un and underutilised land to the 
small farmer/settlement sub-sector directly or via the state;
c. substantial increases in small farmer/settlement sub-sector output 
and productive employment;
d. additional output concentrated on maize, millet and sorghum, 
oilseeds, cotton, tobacco, small stock and beef in the small 
farm/settlement sub-sector and on maize, wheat, tea, coffee, tobacco, 
certain fruits and vegetables, exotic crops for sale to northern 
hemisphere markets and beef in the large commercial farming sub 
sector;
e. substantial relief in respect to food availability and significant in 
respect to balance of payments pressures;
f. modest initial direct revenue gains rapidly declining to relatively 
insignificant levels as land transfers and development take place but 
with a buildup of significant tax revenue on output gains and on 
purchases financed from them.
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PROGRESSIVE LAND TAX
26. The goals to which a progressive land tax is relevant are basically the 
same as those addressed by a rated capacity tax. However its impact 
would not be identical:
a. it would be progressive with respect to hectarage held and therefore 
would create an incentive for large landholders to reduce the size of 
their holdings even if all their land were fully utilised;
b. because it would not be offsettable against income tax, a progressive 
land tax might provide a more stable secondary source of revenue than 
the rated capacity tax;
c. by the same token it would increase total taxation on holdings above 
minimum level not subject to tax (and especially on very large 
holdings) but it would have a zero marginal rate with respect to 
production increases.
d. at plausible levels per hectare it would probably be less effective
in promoting development or transfer to the small farmer/settlement
sub-sector of under or unutilised land particularly from middle sized 
holdings.
27. Certain conceptual and practical problems exist with respect to a 
progressive land tax:
a. it is a wealth tax levied on one farm of wealth only and would
therefore create an incentive for allocating new investment to 
sectors other than large scale commercial agriculture;
b. at high rates it might cause abandonment or disorderly division of
significant numbers of large landholdings with not insignificant 
interim disruption of production and if initially at low rates might 
give rise to uncertainty as to future levels which would inhibit
* ■* - 2 1 -
desirable large commercial farm development investment;
c. corporate farms (including ranches and plantations) would be subject
to high rates of tax unless special provisions were made for them.
In respect to certain crops - e.g. sugar, tea - at least large core
estates are probably necessary for productive efficiency and the same 
may hold true of certain types of medium to small scale irrigation 
schemes.
28. However, these problems are by no means as clear or general as they may 
appear and, to the extent they are real, can be minimised by careful 
formulation of the tax:
a. because it is in agriculture that small scale, labour intensive 
production and investment has the most general comparative efficiency 
as a partial substitute for large scale, capital intensive
investment, there is a case for creating an incentive pattern for 
large scale investment moderately skewed in favour of sectors other 
than large scale agriculture. This is particularly true of the 
significant portion of recent and present large commercial farm sub 
sector investment designed to substitute capital for labour rather 
than to raise output. The disincentive effect would be sharpest in 
respect to land speculation and land hoarding which are types of
investment which it is in the public interest to discourage;
b. care can be taken to avoid setting rates at levels which would do
serious damage to the economic viability of well run large scale
commercial farms. Fears of future rates esculating can be reduced by 
a clear statement of intent to avoid rates damaging well run holdings 
of reasonable size and to hold initial rates constant for at least
three years;
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c. in the case of crops or production techniques which are economically
desirable and for which there are substantial economies of scale
exemptions or reductions of rates per hectare applicable either by 
category or for specific enterprise could be provided for to be made 
by orders issued under his hand by the Minister for Finance,
published in the Gazette and appended to the Act as Schedules. In 
respect to certain plantations - e.g. tea, sugar, perhaps coffee and
beans - exemptions might be conditional on the development of viable
outgrower schemes to agreed levels over an agreed time frame since 
the combination of a core estate and contract, small farmer 
outgrowers has proven effective in these crops in other countries. 
However, there neither should nor would be any presumption that huge 
corporate holdings - e.g. in ranching or grain production - were 
economically more efficient and therefore there would be no 
presumption that exemptions - conditional or otherwise - would be 
issued for all corporate farm holdings.
29. The progressive land tax would:
a. be levied on all holdings above the exemption limit provided for in 
the rated capacity tax schedule;
b. be operated on the same land category system as the rated capacity 
tax;
c. be on a slab basis with a fixed tax on hectarage in each slab; with
d. the number of hectares in each slab varying from category to category 
so that progressivity was related to economic size rather than purely 
to physical extent;
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e. be computed with reference to the rated capacity tax base as a rough 
indication of land value, e.g.
i. Slab 1 - 1$ of rated capacity value;
ii. Slab 2 - 1.5% of rated capacity value;
iii. Slab 3 - 2.5% of rated capacity value;
iv. Slab 4 - 4.0Í of rated capacity value;
v. Slab 5 - 6.0Í of rated capacity value;
vi. Slab 6 - 8.5% of rated capacity value;
vii. Slab 7 - 11.5% of rated capacity value.
f. include provisions for exemptions by category or specific enterprise, 
production unit or holding for cases in which it was in the national 
economic interest to encourage large scale agricultural production 
units.
30. For the sake of illustration in respect to average quality arable land
the
a.
slabs might be: 
Exempt 0 to 10 hectares Nil
b. Slab 1 10 to 100 hectares n
c. Slab 2 100 to 250 hectares 1.5 %
3 250 to 500 hectares 2.5%
4 500 to 1000 hectares 4.0%
5 1000 to 1750 hectares 6.0%
6 1750 to 2500 hectares 8.5%
7 Over 2500 hectares 11.5%
The implications of a progressive land tax would be:
3. increasing the economic attractiveness of non—farm relative to farm 
large scale investment except with respect to exempt categories or 
enterprises;
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b. strengthening the relative position of small and medium scale farming 
relative to large scale farming:
c. discouraging massive corporate farms except in cases in which 
substantial nationally relevant economies of scale led to the 
issuance of exemptions;
d. discouraging land hoarding and speculation;
e. increasing the progressivity of the tax structure and providing 
perhaps $20 million a year of revenue until very substantial land 
transfers to the small farmer/settlement sub sector had taken place;
f. increasing the amount of land made available - directly or via the 
state - to the small farmer/settlement sub sector and also to medium 
scale farmer on a willing buyer, willing seller basis;
g. moderately stimulating output because:
i. increased output would not raise progressive land tax 
liability and would, therefore, be the most effective 
means to offset its impact while continuing to hold the 
land;
ii. there would be a tendency to dispose of under and 
unutilised land and of relatively inefficiently operated 
farms so that more productive use would, on average, be 
made of land after than before transfer.
32. Certain technical issue examination, information and elaboration would be
necessary to decide on the exact form, rates, schedules and exemptions to
the progressive land tax and to draft a bill:
a. in respect to determination and definition of land categories; rough
survey of hectarage; checking of output levels/gross to net 
ratios/averge income tax liability; possible forms of abatement; 
indexation of ratios; provision for decennial revision; procedures
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for allocating hectarage; and integration of tax with land registers 
these would be done as part of the preparatory work for the gross 
rated capacity tax (see Para 23 "a” through ”h" above) if, as
proposed, the progressive land tax is adopted at the same time as and 
with a structure related to the gross rated capacity tax;
b. a method of determining overall slabs applicable for farms with more 
than one category of land would be needed (an exercise complementary 
to that needed to set exempt limits for holdings of more than one 
category of land for the gross rated capacity tax);
c. a method for determining common ownership with respect to individual 
and corporate holdings to avoid artificial ’division* of holdings to 
avoid tax;
d. deciding whether or not to allow this tax as an expense before 
computation of (not as an offset against) income tax which would 
reduce any negative (enhance any positive) impact on production but 
would also substantially weaken its progressivity and reduce net 
revenue derived from its introduction particularly with respect to 
large individual holdings;
e. establish a simple collection procedure possibly on a return and at 
dates linked to those for income tax (see Par 23 "i");
f. identify the cases (e.g specific crops), conditions (e.g. production 
systems) and special requirements (e.g. phased development of 
outgrower schemes) necessary to qualify for exemptions or re-rating 
at lower per hectare rates of tax;
g. establish an appeals procedure, preferably integrated with that for 
the gross rated capacity tax (see Para 23 ”j”) •
33. The results of a progressive land tax are projected as including:
a. effects on output, land transfers, food availability and exports
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complementary to (but less significant) than those listed in respect 
to the gross rated capacity tax at Para 25;
b. direct revenue effects initially lower than but probably less rapidly 
declining than those of the gross rated capacity tax;
c. a moderate shift in large scale investment allocations toward 
non-agricultural uses and within agriculture to exempted production 
units;
d. a distinct pressure toward lesser inequality in landholdings (and 
therefore rural incomes) in general and against very large individual 
and non-exempt corporate holdings in particular.
Therefore, while basically complementary and secondary to the gross rated 
capacity tax, the progressive land tax would add an additional element of 
progressivity and alter relative attractiveness of large scale investment 
toward non-farm uses and exempted agricultual production units.
CONCLUSION
34. Introduction of an appropriate land tax system is critical to resolving 
several of the major economic problems confronting Zimbabwe:
a. low rate of growth of agricultual output and
b. consequential negative trends in the agriculural sector balance of 
payments as well as
c. negative rates of growth of wage and low rates of growth of adequate 
productivity/income self employment in agriculture related to
d. massive non and underutilisation of land by the large scale 
commercial sub-sector combined with limited access to land for 
peasant farmers as well as
e. very high inequality in agricultural land ownership/use rights.
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35. To grapple with these problems land taxes should:
a. impose substantial costs on non or underutilisation of land; as well 
as on
b. very large holdings (except those for which a specific technical or 
economies of scale justification can be made);
c. avoid having a high marginal rate with respect to output;
d. be linked to policies facilitating the transfer of land/land use 
rights to the peasant/settlement sub-sectors and providing knowledge, 
production input, capital and basic infrastructure/services to 
complement Zimbabwean small farmer labour and skills.
36. The most appropriate single land tax instrument for attaining these ends 
would be a gross rated capacity output tax offsettable against income 
tax. It would have a zero rate on fully utilised land (and a zero 
marginal rtae on output) but would create a major disincentive for 
holding land un or under utilised rather than developing or selling it.
37. Primarily because a gross rated capacity tax would not deal directly with 
the equality and distributional issues arising out of the present extreme 
inequality in landholdings, a progressive land tax is a desirable 
complement to it. It too would have a zero marginal rate on additional 
output and would encourage transfers of land - directly or via the state 
- to smallholders, settlement schemes and production cooperatives.
38. Because the problems to which these measures would be addressed are both
grave and urgent and because the process of land transfer and
smallholder, settlement scheme, production co-operative expansion of 
output will take time, an early decision to act along these lines - and
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especially to adopt a rated capacity output tax - is crucial. There 
would be substantial technical work to be done in elaborating and 
instituting the proposed tax measures, but this need not delay a decision 
in principle which is in practice necessary to secure priority attention 
to doing the technical work and drafting.
